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《非对称信贷违约风险信息下供应链融资模式选择与激励机制设计》（四）

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本文第二章：不对称违约风险信息下的现金-信贷支付方案设计。

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Dear you, this is LearningYard Academy.Today,

the editor brings you a doctoral dissertation intensive reading"Supply Chain Financing Model Selection and Incentive Mechanism Design under Asymmetric Credit Default Risk Information" (4)

I will introduce you to:The second chapter: the design of cash-credit payment scheme under asymmetric default risk information.It will take you about ten minutes.

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本章的享非信贷下供选择研究目标包括整合运营和融资决策,并提供有关于不对称信息对现金-信贷支付方案的设计和模式选择的影响.本章研究在以下四个方面补充了现有的文献研究。

首先,本章研究了非对称信用信息下的违约供应商现金-信贷支付方案设计的问题。据现有文献所知,非对称信用信息很少在文献中被研究,尽管它广泛存在于供应链商业贸易的风险实践中。

其次,本章分析了各个交易模式下现金-信贷支付方案制定的融资特点,并探讨了供应商如何选择具体的模式。

再次,本章发现与完全信息下基准模型相比,高信用客户的模式信贷期和产品订购消费数量都受到限制,而低信用客户的信贷期和产品订购消费数量在甄别模式中保持不变,在审查模式中得到促进,在保险模式中抑制减少。

最后,本章发现如果消费市场的悦分应链整体信用状况相对较差,供应商则倾向于只采用甄别模式。另外,基于信用激励效应和违约风险缺口效应之间的享非信贷下供选择权衡关系,供应商有更大的回旋余地来决定是通过采用保险模式转移风险还是通过采用甄别模式和审查模式承担风险。

The research objectives of this chapter include integrating operational and financing decisions, and providing insights into the impact of asymmetric information on the design and mode selection of cash-to-credit payment schemes. This chapter complements existing literature research in the following four areas.

First, this chapter studies the problem of supplier cash-credit payment scheme design under asymmetric credit information. As far as the existing literature is known, asymmetric credit information is rarely studied in the literature, although it exists widely in the practice of supply chain commercial trade.

Secondly, this chapter analyzes the characteristics of cash-credit payment scheme formulation under each transaction mode, and discusses how suppliers choose specific modes.

Thirdly, this chapter finds that compared with the baseline model under complete information, the credit period and product order consumption quantity of high-credit customers are limited, while the credit period and product order consumption quantity of low-credit customers remain unchanged in the screening model, and in the review model. In the insurance mode, it is promoted, and in the insurance mode, the inhibition is reduced.

Finally, this chapter finds that if the overall credit status of the consumer market is relatively poor, suppliers tend to use only the screening model. In addition, based on the trade-off relationship between the credit incentive effect and the default risk gap effect, suppliers have more leeway to decide whether to transfer risks by adopting the insurance mode or take the risk by adopting the screening mode and the review mode.

2.1

问题描述

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文章考虑由一个供应商和一个客户组成的违约直销供应链.供应商设计并生产一批产品并销售给客户.客户由于受资金约束，通常很难一次性支付全部采购成本.为了提高客户消费,供应商通常会向客户提供现金-信贷支付方案。

事件发展顺序如下:(1)期初,客户的信用水平信息私人拥有,供应商无法得知;(2)然后,供应商选择一种信贷模式,并向客户提供一个现金-信贷支付合同;(3)在考虑到自己的信用类型后,客户接受或者拒绝支付合同.如果拒绝,交易结束;否则,将订购q(Ti)数量的货物;(4)供应商开始以单位成本c生产产品并交付货物给客户;(5)供应商在产品交付给客户后立即收到预付现金Mi;(6)客户以单位批发价格w在T时段后完成最终的信贷付款。

The article considers a direct selling supply chain consisting of a supplier and a customer. The supplier designs and manufactures a batch of products and sells them to the customer. Due to the financial constraints, it is usually difficult for the customer to pay the full purchase cost at one time. In order to improve customer consumption, supply Merchants typically offer cash-to-credit payment options to customers.

The sequence of events develops as follows: (1) At the beginning of the period, the customer's credit level information is privately owned and cannot be known by the supplier; (2) Then, the supplier selects a credit model and offers the customer a cash-credit payment contract; (3) ) The customer accepts or refuses to pay the contract after taking into account its own credit type. If rejected, the transaction ends; otherwise, q(Ti) quantity of goods will be ordered; (4) The supplier begins to produce the product and deliver the goods at unit cost c to the customer; (5) the supplier receives the cash advance Mi immediately after the product is delivered to the customer; (6) the customer completes the final credit payment after T period at the wholesale price w per unit.content_copyshare

2.2

完全信息下的基准模型

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命题2.1基准模型下各信用客户的最优信贷期,预付款以及产品消费数量。命题2.1给出了供应商的最优决策.由于客户的效用仅为其在完全信息下的保留收益,因此供应链产生的收益均会被供应商获得.此时,无论客户的信用类型,供应商均会提供一定的信贷期,即TBi?>0,以激励客户消费更多。

一方面,从激励的角度考虑参数的影响.给定αc,推论2.2意味着αs越大TBH?越小,即折现率越高的供应商会设置更短的信贷还款期.这是因为折现率差α代表资金时间价值的差异,较高的α意味着供应商较大的资金折现,这将比销售激励效应更受供应商的关注,为降低折现损失,供应商会缩短信贷期。然而,当违约率θH增加时,客户的实际信用情况将从好转差,因此,供应商将延长信贷期TBH?,以提高销售额和现金预付款。此外,对于信贷销售敏感系数b,如果放宽信贷期能有效激励信贷销售,供应商将延长信贷期TbH?以提高利润。

另一方面,从运营的角度考虑参数的影响。当单位批发价格w相对于现金预付款MBH?增加时,供应商将更关注信贷付款部分,故供应商将降低信贷期TBH?以降低违约风险。此外,对于单位生产成本c,较高的c促使供应商缩短信贷期以保证在尽量短的时间内尽快回本,为此供应商将信贷期TBH?设置的尽可能短。但是,当客户对产品的效用估值v增加时,供应商总是可以增加现金预付款MBH?,以提取客户增加的效用,因此,供应商更愿意延长信贷期TBH?,以提高其利润。

Proposition 2.1 The optimal credit period, advance payment and product consumption quantity of each credit customer under the benchmark model. Proposition 2.1 gives the optimal decision of the supplier. Since the utility of the customer is only its retained revenue under complete information, the revenue generated by the supply chain will be obtained by the supplier. At this time, regardless of the customer's credit type, the supply All merchants will provide a certain credit period, namely TBi?>0, to encourage customers to consume more.

On the one hand, consider the influence of parameters from the perspective of incentives. Given αc, Corollary 2.2 means that the larger αs, the smaller the TBH?, that is, the supplier with higher discount rate will set a shorter credit repayment period. This is because the discount rate The difference in the present rate α represents the difference in the time value of funds. A higher α means that the supplier has a larger discount of funds, which will be more concerned by the supplier than the sales incentive effect. In order to reduce the discount loss, the supplier will shorten the credit period . However, when the default rate θH increases, the actual credit situation of customers will get better and worse, so the supplier will extend the credit period TBH? to improve sales and cash advances. In addition, for the credit sales sensitivity coefficient b, if relaxing the credit period can effectively stimulate credit sales, the supplier will extend the credit period TbH? to increase profits.

On the other hand, the influence of parameters is considered from an operational point of view. When the unit wholesale price w increases relative to the cash advance MBH*, the supplier will pay more attention to the credit payment part, so the supplier will reduce the credit period TBH* to reduce the default risk. In addition, for the unit production cost c, a higher c prompts the supplier to shorten the credit period to ensure that the cost is recovered as soon as possible in the shortest possible time, so the supplier sets the credit period TBH? as short as possible. However, when the customer's valuation v of the utility of the product increases, the supplier can always increase the cash advance MBH? to withdraw the customer's increased utility, so the supplier is more willing to extend the credit period TBH? to improve its profit.

2.3

非对称信息下的模型分析

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本节从三个方面来进行分析包括：甄别模式下的信贷融资、审查模式下的信贷融资、保险模式下的信贷融资。本节主要关注在不对称信用信息下三种信贷模式对现金-信贷支付方案的影响以及供应商如何利用不同的模式来设计最佳信贷期及产品消费数量。具体来说,甄别模式允许供应商直接提供合同菜单以识别客户的信用类型,这一模式没有额外的成本,但往往伴随着逆向选择,无法实现有效配置。相比之下,审查模式能够识别和评估客户的私人信息,但需要付出评估成本,评估的准确性会本质上影响最终收益。最后,通过与保险公司签订一定保费的合同,保险模式被广泛应用于防范信贷违约风险。在这三种模式中,甄别模式和审查模式属于风险自担模式,这意味着承担信贷风险的企业会利用其内部资源来补偿损失。然而,保险模式是一种风险转移模式,它要求支付一定的保险费以规避违约风险。因此,为了应对与客户信用水平有关的不对称信息,还要权衡风险和收益,供应商需要从上述三个模式中选择一个以最大化其期望利润。

This section analyzes from three aspects: credit financing under screening mode, credit financing under review mode, and credit financing under insurance mode. This section focuses on the impact of the three credit models on the cash-credit payment scheme under asymmetric credit information and how suppliers use different models to design optimal credit periods and product consumption quantities. Specifically, the screening mode allows suppliers to directly provide a contract menu to identify the customer's credit type, which has no additional cost, but is often accompanied by adverse selection and cannot achieve efficient configuration. In contrast, censorship mode can identify and evaluate customers' private information, but requires evaluation costs, and the accuracy of evaluation will essentially affect the final benefit. Finally, the insurance model is widely used to prevent the risk of credit default by signing contracts with insurance companies for a certain premium. Among the three models, the screening model and the review model belong to the risk-taking model, which means that the enterprise taking credit risk will use its internal resources to compensate for the loss. However, the insurance model is a risk transfer model, which requires a certain insurance premium to avoid default risk. Therefore, in order to deal with the asymmetric information related to the customer's credit level, but also to weigh the risks and benefits, the supplier needs to choose one of the above three modes to maximize its expected profit.

2.4

各个模式下的信贷融资合同比较

本节主要关注在面对不对称信息时,各个模式下供应商处理违约风险的特点.，包括：最优信贷期的比较、最优消费的比较、最优现金预付款的比较。为使讨论更有意义,关注点集中于各模式下供应商的最优决策为正的情况。

This section mainly focuses on the characteristics of suppliers dealing with default risk in each mode when faced with asymmetric information, including: comparison of optimal credit period, comparison of optimal consumption, and comparison of optimal cash advance. In order to make the discussion more meaningful, we focus on the situation where the supplier's optimal decision is positive in each mode.

2.5

数值分析

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本章旨在探讨供应链中供应商如何采用现金-信贷支付方案对客户消费行为进行激励。然而,信贷支付在激励客户对产品进行消费的同时,也会带来机会成本和信贷违约风险.通过搭建委托-代理模型,即客户精确知道自己的信用类型,而供应商只对每种客户信用类型有一个概率估计,本章探讨了信息不对称对供应商-客户链中信贷期和消费决策的影响。

此外,本章讨论了三种常见的信贷违约管理模式:甄别模式,审查模式和保险模式。其中,前两种模式属于风险自担策略,最后一种属于风险转移策略。针对每一种模式,研究了供应商如何设计最优信贷期和消费决策,以及确定了供应商在何种情况选择相应的最优模式。

最后,本章提出了几点管理发现,例如,高信用客户的信贷期和产品消费都会受到限制。此外,当市场信用情况较差时,供应商将只采用甄别模式来控制违约风险。然而,随着市场信用条件提升,由于高度不确定的信贷违约威胁和低效的甄别模式,考虑到风险和收益的平衡,供应商将在不同区域采用不同的模式,从而使决策更具策略性.随着市场信用条件继续提升时,由于市场几乎完全由高信用客户组成,为了激励消费者对产品进行消费并最大化自己的利润,供应商愿意根据违约风险差效应的情况采用甄别模式或审查模式。最后,市场信用状况,信贷激励效应与违约风险差效应之间的紧密关系是促使供应商评判及选择适当模式以降低违约损失的主要因素。对于未来的研究拓展,有很多方向可以丰富本章所提出的模型。一个可能的拓展方向是将客户偏好融入到运营决策中,因为对于给定的产品,不同的客户有自己的价值评估,进而引起不同的信贷融资决策.另一个可拓展的方向是结合信号博弈。

This chapter aims to explore how suppliers in the supply chain use cash-credit payment schemes to incentivize customer consumption behavior. However, while credit payment incentivizes customers to consume products, it also brings opportunity cost and credit default risk. By building a principal-agent model, customers know exactly their credit types, while suppliers only pay for each type of customer credit. Type has a probability estimate, and this chapter explores the impact of information asymmetry on credit terms and consumption decisions in supplier-customer chains.

In addition, this chapter discusses three common credit default management models: screening model, review model and insurance model. Among them, the first two modes belong to the risk-taking strategy, and the last one belongs to the risk transfer strategy. For each mode, it studies how suppliers design the optimal credit period and consumption decision, and determines the circumstances under which the supplier chooses the corresponding optimal mode.

Finally, the chapter presents several managerial findings, such as the limited credit period and product consumption of high-credit customers. In addition, when the market credit situation is poor, the supplier will only use the screening mode to control the default risk. However, as market credit conditions improve, due to the highly uncertain threat of credit default and inefficient screening models, suppliers will adopt different models in different regions considering the balance of risks and benefits, making decision-making more strategic .As the market credit conditions continue to improve, since the market is almost entirely composed of high-credit customers, in order to motivate consumers to consume the product and maximize their own profits, suppliers are willing to adopt a screening model or review based on the differential effect of default risk model. Finally, the close relationship between market credit status, credit incentive effect and default risk differential effect is the main factor that prompts suppliers to judge and choose appropriate models to reduce default losses. For future research expansion, there are many directions to enrich the model proposed in this chapter. One possible extension direction is to integrate customer preferences into operational decisions, because for a given product, different customers have their own value assessments, which in turn lead to different credit financing decisions. Another extension direction is to combine signal games.

END

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参考资料：谷歌翻译

参考文献：王凯. 非对称信贷违约风险信息下供应链融资模式选择与激励机制设计 [D]. 天津: 天津大学. 2020[2022-8-28].

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